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Revisiting Ontology and Its Consequences

This is a paper about the role of our ontological presuppositions in shaping our interpretations of scientific practice, and our self-conception as philosophers of science. It may seem obvious that our ontological commitments, our sense of what it is to “be” or to “exist”, should carry important consequences for how we understand the work both of the scientist and the philosopher, but because such commitments tend to be relegated to the liminal recesses of our awareness, they are rarely explicitly considered or thought “all the way down”. In recent decades, philosophers of science have all but institutionalised this uncritical attitude toward our ontological commitments as well as their confinement to the outer reaches of our discipline with the widely held belief that the question of what there is in the world should be left to the exclusive determination of scientists, for whom it is regarded as constituting a more natural line of research

For the next twenty minutes or so, I’d like to engage in a series of very brief thought experiments designed to illuminate what happens to our conceptions of scientific and philosophic practice when our sense of what it is for us to be in the world shifts. In conducting these experiments, I’m hoping to do a couple of things. First, I’d like to be able to persuade you that to the extent that science does engage in ontology, it does so by default. To appreciate what I might mean by this, it will help to encourage at the outset a distinction between “ontology” as a determination or inventorying what there “is”, and “ontology” understood as a more qualitative line of philosophical inquiry aimed at accounting for the nature of something’s being, the “how” it is to “be” that thing. And, because I’m sensitive to the fact that philosophers of science have a history of resisting this sort of “Continental-speak”, I hope it won’t strike anyone as too controversial or obnoxious if I simply insist that in looking to the history of its usage, the latter definition is really the more properly “ontological” one. A second aim in conducting these experiments is to convince you that ontological commitments of the latter variety have far-reaching consequences for how we understand what it is that scientists and philosophers do, and that, if we hope to build healthy, independent philosophies, capable of meaningfully engaging with scientific practice, we will need to reconsider our apparent readiness to cede the ontological question to science.

So, because our time is limited and there’s a lot of ground to cover, let’s begin. Let’s say, for argument’s sake, we accept the premise that philosophers of science should defer to scientists’ ontological understandings; the question then becomes, what is the scientist’s ontology? Because the question, as it is posed, is a broad one, we will want to look beyond the tenets of specialised bodies of scientific knowledge toward what can be considered true of any scientific practice so long as it’s treated in its general contours. When we take this tack, we find that whatever else it might be, the scientist’s ontology is an objectivism in that her practice aims at a vision of the world that would transcend her relationship to it, a world closed in over itself with only the scientist’s disembodied, observing mind left over. The scientist’s objectivism is revealed in her method of working and most particularly in her attempts to purify the object of her research of any predicates attaching to it as a result of her interaction with it. This suggests then, that the scientist is guided by a dualist ontology in which a mind that would see everything, a kosmotheoros, is understood to exist in confrontation with a material world in itself.

Now, it will be important to appreciate that in taking seriously this notion that scientific practice constitutes an ontological enterprise in which the philosopher has no business meddling, the philosopher will automatically find she is constrained to consider only that comparatively small portion of scientific work that is already accomplished and widely accepted as true. Such a retrospectively-oriented stance will invite her to conceive of scientific practice first and foremost in terms of the image given of it in the published scientific paper. This perspective will favour the idea of scientists as “thinkers” operating in a conceptual or linguistic medium, to reveal a world organised according to transcendent empirical laws. The structure of the average paper’s argument will suggest a three-pronged conception of scientific practice, consisting of observation, conjecture, and verification. Observation will seem to involve a detached and thoroughly rational assessment of the research object. Conjecture will be understood to entail a systematic elaboration of theories, with special premiums being placed on qualities like simplicity, consistency and predictability, all of which will be interpreted as markers of the theories’ truth. And lastly, verification will be taken to implicate an essentially deductive and, consequently, highly authoritative practice, the result of which will seem to be an asymptotic approach of scientific representations to the world as it is in itself. Taken as a whole then, this ontology will lead us to a conception of science as the epitome of human rationality, a systematic application of rational methods of investigation aimed at uncovering some fully objectifiable and universal truth about the world. And, if this image is recognised beyond the relatively specialised practice of philosophy, it will be, in part, because it is the one we are most likely to have been given in the course of our early schooling.

So, having thus established science’s authority, and, in the process, eliminated the bulk of its work from reflection’s purview, we might well ask ourselves what it is that will be left for the philosopher to do. Assimilating the scientist’s notion of a kosmotheoros to her own discipline, the philosopher will be tempted to view her work in terms of a meta-practice engaged in the analysis of various epistemological components of scientific work. This self-conception will invite the development of models of scientific argumentation, confirmation and explanation, and will encourage reflection on the practices and values supporting inter-theoretic reduction, as well as on more general questions surrounding the nature of science and natural law. Having staked out this ground, the philosopher will understand herself to be charged with the work of verifying, legitimating, and ultimately arbitrating scientists’ claims to truth, by means of her own highly specialised epistemological practice. In essence then, we find that such an ontology will encourage philosophers to view their work in terms of a meta-scientific programme directed at the rational reconstruction and adjudication of the scientist’s methods. 

This image should also strike a familiar chord since it captures a certain constellation of concerns that, until quite recently, represented the better part of philosophical practice. Yet, it seems to me that there are good reasons to wonder whether, in allowing ourselves to be guided by this conception, we haven’t ended in deeply misunderstanding not only science and the natural world, but also our own practice. Some difficulties stem from treating the scientist’s essentially Cartesian ontology as the product of considered scientific inquiry. Most notable in this regard is probably the basic problem of accounting for how even the most transparent mind can be said to reveal the world as it is in itself when these same ontological poles are taken to be established in complete exteriority to one another. In keeping with our original premise, we might dismiss such problems as belonging to science to resolve, but even so, other less-easily dismissed difficulties will persist. I’ll just mention a couple. 

First, there seems to me to be something unquestionably self-defeating about philosophers claiming, on the one hand, that science is an essentially ontological enterprise, and, on the other, that in order to preserve the integrity of scientific work and to ensure that its natural course of development is allowed to proceed uninterrupted, the philosopher must excise this same ontological inquiry from her own philosophical landscape. The demonstrable problem, of course, is that in holding both positions at the same time, the philosopher is afforded too few points of contact with scientific practice to effect any sort of realistic or meaningful interpretation of it or its results. 

Second, in conceiving of philosophic practice as a meta-science charged with adjudicating the epistemic legitimacy of scientific practices, it seems to me there is a strong case to be made that philosophers end in deeply misunderstanding the nature of their own work. What such a view fails to consider  is the extent to which, in relinquishing ontology to science, philosophers have left themselves beholden to the same practices and conceptions they seek to judge. The result is that the philosopher’s work is less a dispassionate evaluation of the rational standards employed by various scientific arguments, than it is a form of accidental complicity in the disciplinary narratives enacted by scientists to promote their own interests, a complicity that ends in a kind of inadvertent advocacy, sometimes for, and other times against, the legitimacy of individual scientific practices and results. And, if we are unaccustomed to recognise this fact, I suggest it’s probably because the philosopher’s services in either promoting or subverting the authority of the scientist, are ultimately made redundant by the fact that science, perhaps somewhat inconveniently for philosophers, appears to include its own meta-practice.
 
To review then, the traditional line gives us a problematic view of nature, a distorted view of science and scientific practice, and a pretty seriously anaemic philosophy. But then, perhaps we were a bit too quick to read an ontology into the scientist’s method of proceeding. If we consider the basic situation of our daily lives, what strikes us as most prominently lacking in the scenario we just explored is any sort of account of our embodiment. This raises the question of what happens when we take seriously the idea that we’re not just minds, but also bodies. And, incidentally, certain scientific results can be interpreted as setting a precedent for this sort of ontological understanding as well. 

As we might expect, incorporating our bodies into our most basic sense of being in the world results in a dramatic reshaping of the ontological landscape. This is because, unlike our minds, there can be no pretending that our bodies exist in radical opposition to the world. As our breath attests, the world is continually coursing through us, allowing itself to be taken up and transformed into blood, cells and organs, it participates in both our growth and our decay. In this way, our bodies would seem to constitute something of a natal bond with the earth and, in so doing, would seem to suggest that the problem of worldly access that so distressed Descartes, was really never anything other than an illusion generated by misguided thinking. On such a view, reality will seem to be given only at those points where the body and world meet, thereby constraining our understanding to operate from within certain horizons. In making room for the contributions of the body then, our operative ontological image will be transformed from one in which consciousness is held to exist in confrontation with a knowable world to one in which one’s body finds itself a participant in a polymorphous, diacritically structured, and partially opaque eco-system that outruns it in every direction.

Recognising that scientists have bodies that make meaningful and consequential contributions to their knowledge will encourage us to shift our sense of science’s centre of gravity to the lab, where we will be invited to pay greater attention to what the scientist actually does. With her body now understood to act as a condition of her knowledge, the scientist’s objectivism will no longer seem unproblematic, and recognising this fact will enable us to bring into view the full spectrum of ontological indeterminacy and instability permeating all stages of scientific work. In penetrating such obscurities, the scientist’s operative logic will not appear to be conceptual, so much as perceptual, which is to say that she will seem to overcome the ambiguity inherent in her research set up not by thinking about it rationally, but by tinkering with it so as to reveal its material logic and thus bring it into better focus for herself. This connection to primordial perception suggests that scientific practice will entail a series of limits and trade-offs, with universality of application being bought only at the cost of a certain specificity, and vice versa. 

Importantly, such a conception will also enable us to do away with the problems associated with representation by transforming the question of knowledge into one of embodied action. This will give us a science that will seem to advance by means of a process in which, the results of previous inquiry are selectively incorporated into skills, practices, and instruments, that, in subsequently being turned back onto the world, will allow practitioners to reveal new avenues for scientific research. This process will ultimately be responsible for transforming not only our understanding but also the world itself. Strictly speaking, the scientist will not create her meaning, but her situated inquiry will set the parameters from within which the natural world will be able to emerge with a definite shape. In this way, established science will not give us a guarantee of how things objectively stand in the world, so much as it will seem to serve the rather more modest purpose of indicating our commitment to a particular interpretation of it. On such a view, science will not engage in ontological inquiry directly, but instead will seem to offer only first integrations, that is to say, privileged cases in relation to which more complex cases must be understood to be qualitatively different. And because scientific knowledge will no longer be distinct from its various modes of advent, such a project will never fully close in over itself, but will remain a kind of dialectical or maieutic exchange. With the body at the centre of our ontology then, science will seem to be less about discovering nature or replicating it in thought, than it will be about controlled elicitations and transformations of it.
 
The philosopher will find that an embodied ontology opens to reflection a vast new landscape of scientific experience and, consequently, new prospects for expanding her own mandate. In particular, with the emphasis now on embodied knowledge, philosophy will be encouraged to move in the direction of a phenomenology so that the philosopher will be able to capture what is routinely ignored by the scientist, namely, her own participation in the creation of scientific knowledge. Such an approach will empower the philosopher to replace the scientist’s understanding within a wider context of meaning and to reappropriate to philosophical practice the work of ontological inquiry. Serving in this foundational capacity, the philosopher’s work will function as a cautionary corrective, reminding us not only of the demonstrable disjunction between the scientist’s Cartesian self conception and the actual ontological conditions of her practice, but also of the considerable powers attaching to scientific practice with respect to transforming the world we share. Thus, by revealing an incoherence at the heart of the scientific enterprise, such an ontology will seem inevitably to invite a more critical perspective, that will, in turn, enable the philosopher to bypass the work of advocacy, in favour of more meaningful contributions to the work of making sense of the scientist’s practice.

I should perhaps say that an embodied ontology strikes me as a considerable improvement over an unembodied one, not only because it appears to give onto a more comprehensive and realistic image of scientific practice and its ambitions, but, also because, in permitting philosophy to ground itself in nature rather than in science, it seems to afford it a more capacious scope and to set the philosopher’s authority on a more independent and secure footing. Nevertheless, there will be cause for concern here as well, because despite its new freedoms, there will continue to be something inescapably derivative and retrospective about such a philosophy. Of greatest concern is the problem that in recognising the scientist’s body as a condition of her knowledge, it seems to me that we risk ending in inadvertently trapping her experience in the corporeal, introducing both a solipsism and a physicalism that, in the absence of any sort of moderating force, threatens to leave us with a situation in which one’s personal experience will seem to be both everything and nothing. Ultimately, the model seems ill-equipped to account for anything beyond the phenomenology of individual practice, leading one to suggest that what is lacking is a certain robustness, born of difference, that will give to science and philosophy the vital and well-balanced depth necessary to account both for the richness of our experience and for the wide inventiveness evidenced in our intellectual history. 

This recognition leads us then, to our third ontological model in which we ask what happens when we take seriously, not only our physical and material continuity with the natural world, but also our participation in a social order of culture. By understanding culture to feed into our natural experience in ways that will fundamentally transform it, we will introduce yet another kind of fluidity into our notions of identity and difference. Things, people, disciplines, none will be given to us as pure positivities, but will appear as contested fields operating within still wider spheres of contest. Here, even our own identities will not be a simple function of our personal choices and decisions, but instead will seem to testify to the ontological primacy of the social. The advent of language, in particular, will open new possibilities, affording us previously unimagined means of reaching across both intersubjective space and time, enabling us, on the one hand, to take better hold of our past and our future, and, on the other, to reinterpret the same on the basis of the needs of the present. In this way, we will be led to recognise ourselves as participants in a collectively institutionalised history, a history that will already be an ideality, capable of effecting penetrating and lasting transformations across the full spectrum of our experience, but only at the cost of still more limitations to the scope of our individual powers and authority.

And, here again we will find that our ontological model is anticipated in certain corners of the scientific literature. Incorporating the social into our ontological understanding, individual scientific disciplines will seem to be given as contested fields of cultural activity, characterised by disputes concerning the discipline’s identity and attendant sense of historical narrative. For this reason, in addition to relating her work to what is found in the world, the scientist will, for the first time, appear to be concerned with relating her research to that of other practitioners working in her field. The scientist’s awareness of others’ arguments and interpretations, in conjunction with her enculturated consciousness concerning certain discipline-specific standards of evidence, will, from the outset, appear to shape both her method of inquiry and her subsequent understanding, suggesting that a strict demarcation between the natural and the social, and, by extension, between the discovered and the legitimated, will not be possible. 

On the embodied ontological model, we found that scientific achievements were awarded a life beyond their original advent only through their continual reappropriation. Now this same phenomenon will have to be understood on the infinitely more complex order of culture. For this reason, the scientist’s efforts to reduce her conceptions to their most univocal expression will not seem to be a product of the inherent structures of either nature or thought, so much as they will seem to be a function of a culture’s inherent need to guard against its natural tendency toward entropy. In this way, the scientist’s method of proceeding will seem to reaffirm the notion of a science that is equal parts discovery and transformation. Such a conception will enable us to understand why it is that what is given today as an absolute truth, seems bound to be revealed as a limit case tomorrow, and will lead us to recognise an internal relationship between knowledge, truth, and power. 

In the end then, an ontology that would incorporate the operation of culture will effectively do away with any vestige of a fixed reality against which our practices might definitively be tested. Recognition of this fact will encourage philosophers to move toward deflationary, non-reifying, non-reductionist, and non-positivist conceptions not only of science and scientific understanding, but of philosophy and philosophical understanding as well. Because philosophy, like science, will no longer be understood to open onto a positive quiddity, it will not be given as a simple analysis, but instead will seem to offer a rationality in contingency, a creation, that in returning both disciplines to the full depth and flux of the natural and historical world, will challenge us to rethink the nature of truth. Neither a universalism nor a relativism, truth will no longer be given in the manner of a thing, but instead, like a force, it will attract and coordinate the attention of both the philosopher and the scientist, without there ever being any question of its being fully defined or permanently captured by either. Reinterpreted in this way, we will find that philosophical and scientific inquiry are transformed into complementary modes of indwelling, each undertaken from the particular vantage point afforded it by its distinctive history. In embracing such a transformation the philosopher will be encouraged to adapt the tools of the poet to her practice, so that she might attune herself to the conceptual lacunae, the latencies, and the minute shifts in sense, evident in the scientist’s language, in which the seeds of future understanding will be sown. In this way then, it will seem to fall to the philosopher to think with science, while simultaneously thinking apart from it, exploring what is left unsaid with the aim of provoking productive new forms of understanding, and participating on an equal, if different, footing, in the exploration, elaboration, and explanation of the world and its structures.

Finally, I began this talk by suggesting that I hoped, in our short time together, to be able to persuade you of two things: first, that to the extent that science can be said to engage in ontological inquiry, it does so only indirectly, and second, that our ontological presuppositions will play an important part in shaping our sense of the scientific and philosophical enterprises. In the last twenty minutes, we’ve had to cover a good deal of ground, moving at a fair clip. I’ve been restricted to speaking very generally, and in terms that suggest that the scenarios presented in each case are necessitated, when of course they aren’t. But my hope is that if either of these ideas initially seemed contentious, they will appear to be less so now. The fact that all three of our ontological scenarios are well represented in the scientific literature, suggests that even if we choose to understand the scientist’s work as an ontology, we should not thereby imagine that science definitively settles the ontological question one way or another; and, that being the case, there seems to me to be no reason to prohibit ourselves from joining in their fun. What’s more, I hope it will now seem clear that our ontological presuppositions will in fact matter. We have seen that with the introduction of each new model the force of our authority, both as scientists and as philosophers, has gradually been diluted, while the freedom we have to define our respective disciplines has correspondingly grown. By adopting a progressively more realistic understanding of our ontological situation, our sense of the scientific enterprise has gone from the ontological, to the methodological, to the narrative or historical, while our sense of the nature of philosophical work has been transformed from the judicial, to the foundational, to the literary and poetical. However we might choose to understand them, these transformations would seem to point to a compelling relationship of interdependence among these three forms of thought – an interdependence and not a hierarchy – that ultimately, it seems fair to say, it will fall to philosophers to sort out.

(This paper took its inspiration from the work of Joseph Rouse and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.)
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